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How To GETA WAY WITH IMMUNITY:
FDA'S EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION SCHEME AND PREP ACT LIABILITY PROTECTION
IN THE CONTEXT OF

COVID -19

William Chanes Martinez*

Abstract
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays a vital role in our country's response
to biological agents that threaten public health and safety. On December 31, 2019, officials in
Wuhan, China confirmed dozens of cases of pneumonia caused by an unknown pathogen. Chinese
officials later identified that pathogen as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARSCoV-2), which causes the disease COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic has created a perfect
storm for unprecedented and litigation-provoking health harms in the United States.

As the

country's death toll rises and states seek to reopen, many Americans are assessing their COVID19-related health status based on the results of diagnostic and antibody tests, which have been
cleared through the FDA's emergency use authorization scheme notwithstanding their concerning
inaccuracy rates.
This paper argues that the unacceptably high inaccuracy rates of these COVID-19 tests are
a direct result of lax FDA regulation and oversight under current federal law. The Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 (PREP Act) established a framework that extends
blanket immunity from liability to the manufacturers of medical products, including blood assays
and serology tests, that are used to diagnose and treat COVID-19. The breadth and scope of the
statute's immunity make it nearly impossible for an injured plaintiff to recover from injuries
sustained from their use of or reliance on diagnostic tests. This paper details and critiques PREP
Act immunity and proposes several PREP Act reforms aimed at enhancing public health and safety
during an infectious disease pandemic. As special interest groups ramp pressure of the federal and

1

state legislatures to enact additional immunity protection as the states reopen, the quality of
COVID-19 related care and treatment is likely to continue to worsen unless and until the country
implements reforms that authorize meaningful medical device regulation and oversight.

Introduction
On December 31, 2019, Chinese officials in Wuhan, China confirmed dozens of cases of
pneumonia caused by an unknown pathogen.1 Soon after, thousands of people in China were
attacked by the rampant spread of the disease.2 The pathogen responsible for the outbreak was
later identified as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), which causes
the disease known as COVID-19. 3
On January 11, 2020, China reported its first COVID-19 death.4 Ten days later, the United
States announced its first confirmed coronavirus case in Washington State.5 Twelve days later,
China placed Wuhan, a city of eleven million people, on lockdown. 6 Transmission of COVID-19
became widespread and thrust the world into a global pandemic. 7 In a matter of weeks, the death
toll in China, Italy, and Spain escalated into the thousands.'
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i Robin Muccari, et al., Coronavirus Timeline: Tracking the critical moments of COVID-19, NBC NEWS (2020),
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(last visited Jun 9, 2020).
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Wu, Ching-Sung Chen & Yu-Jiun Chan, The outbreak of COVID-19: An overview, 83 J. CHINESE MED.
Ass'N 217 (2020).
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5 Id.
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Id.
Kate

Mayberry,

New

York

state virus death toll surpasses 10,000: Live updates, AL JAZZERA,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus-deaths-slow-italy-france-live-updates-200413000419105.html
(last visited June 9, 2020).
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On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global public
health emergency. 9 The next day, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the virus a national public
health emergency.1 0 Secretary Alex Azar, who heads the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), made a similar declaration on the same day." In so doing, Secretary Azar said,
"While this virus poses a serious public health threat, the risk to the American public remains low
at this time, and we are working to keep this risk low.""
An effective pandemic response requires the early detection and isolation of potentially
infectious individuals.1 3 "In managing a pandemic, there is almost nothing more important than
widespread, effective testing."" China suffered initial delays in mitigating the spread of COVID19, but developed a diagnostic test within about two weeks." South Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan's successful responses to COVID-19 are largely attributable to widespread testing. 16
Large-scale testing of individuals with COVID-19 symptoms and those who have made contact
with infectious individuals complimented by aggressive contact tracing allowed those countries to
rapidly isolate and quarantine transmission vectors.17

9 Muccari, supra note 1.
10

Id.

" HHS Press Office, Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel
Coronavirus,

DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH

AND

HUMAN

SERVICES

(2020),

https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novelcoronavirus.html (last visited June 9, 2020).
12

Id.

Philip J. Rosenthal, The Importance of Diagnostic Testing during a Viral Pandemic: Early Lessons from Novel
CoronavirusDisease (COVID-19), 102 AMER. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 915 (2020).
13

"

Coronavirus

VI:

Testing:

Last

Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7r4c-jr7g0 (last visited Jun 9, 2020) [hereinafter LastWeekTonight].
15

Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 915.

16

Id.

17

See LastWeekTonight, supra note 14.

(2020),

The importance of widespread and accurate COVID-19 testing cannot be overstated. 18
Take, for instance, the following example. In late January 2020, a 56-year-old woman whose
husband had tested positive for the disease traveled from Wuhan, China to Thailand. She presented
no symptoms upon arrival at the Thai hospital and her nasopharyngeal and throat swabs tests came
back negative for COVID-19, 19 although the hospital noted that she coughed during her
examination.20 Chest X-rays, however, showed that her lungs were full of fluid, which is indicative
of a COVID-19 infection. 2 1 She was tested once more after those X-Rays but the results remained
inconclusive. Three days later, she tested positive for COVID-19. 22
This example demonstrates how critical accurate testing is to virus containment. 23 As the
number of cases continued to increase across the globe, DHHS Secretary Azar made a second
determination on February 4, 2020. He invoked the agency's Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) applicable to in vitro diagnostics2 4 designed to detect and/or diagnose COVID-19 pursuant
to Section 564 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 25
Section 564, as amended by the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Project BioShield) and
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA), authorizes the

18

Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 915.
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Id.

20
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Id.
Id.
Id.

23

See id.

24

In vitro diagnostics are tests are performed on blood samples that have been taken from the human body. See Center

for Devices and Radiological Health, In Vitro Diagnostics,U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/products-and-medical-procedures/vitro-diagnostics (last updated Oct. 25, 2019). In vitro diagnostics can
detect diseases or other conditions and can be used to monitor a person's overall health to help cure, treat, or prevent
diseases. Id.

in CoronavirusResponse Efforts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-significant-step-coronavirus-response-effortsissues-emergency-use-authorization-first [hereinafter CDC EUA].
25 See FDA Takes Significant Step
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DHHS Secretary to declare a public health emergency. 26 Once such an emergency is declared, the
Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may, on a temporary basis, allow
either: (1) the use of an unapproved/uncleared medical product (e.g., drug, vaccine, or diagnostic
device); or (2) an unapproved use (i.e., an emergency use) of an approved medical product to
diagnose, treat, or prevent a serious or life-threatening disease or condition. 27 Secretary Azar's
February 4, 2020 EUA declaration authorized the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) to use its "2019-nCoV Real-Time RT-PCR" diagnostic test at CDC-qualified labs across
the United States. 2 8
On February 29, 2020, the FDA issued guidance 2 9 that authorized commercial, academic,
and government labs to develop and use self-validated COVID-19 tests prior to the agency's
review of their EUA requests. 30 After such validation, FDA required labs to notify the agency of
their intent to submit an EUA request within 15 days.31

See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020), https://www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization
(last visited
May 19, 2020).
26

27

See Authorization for medical products for use in emergencies, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3.

FDA
Issues
Emergency
Use
Authorization,
GLOBAL
BIODEFENSE
(Feb.
4,
https://globalbiodefense.com/2020/02/04/fda-issues-emergency-use-authorization-for-the-first-2019-novelcoronavirus-diagnostic/.
28

2020),

Guidance documents are documents prepared for FDA staff, regulated industry, and the public that describe the
agency's interpretation of or policy on a regulatory issue. See Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Guidance
Documents (Medical Devices and Radiation-Emitting Products), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/guidance-documentsmedical-devices-and-radiation-emitting-products (last visited June 9, 2020). Guidance documents are not law and do
not operate to bind FDA or the public. Id.
29

30

FDA issues guidancefor expanded development of coronavirusdiagnostic tests, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar.
3,

2020), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/politics-policy/fda-issues-guidance-expanded-development-coronavirusdiagnostic-tests (last visited June 9, 2020); see also FDA Allows High-Complexity CLIA-Certified Labs to Perform
Coronavirus Testing, GENOMEWEB (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.genomewebco
cr/fda-allowsli-complexity-

clia-certified-labs-perfonn-coronavims-testin
31 MODERN HEALTHCARE, supra note 30.
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During an April 2, 2020 a press event on the White House lawn, President Trump praised
a new rapid diagnostic test developed by Abbott Laboratories, a major U.S. medical device
company.32 "That's a whole new ballgame," Mr. Trump said, referring to the test." "I want to
thank Abbott Labs for the incredible work they've done. They've been working around-theclock."" FDA had granted Abbott Laboratories EUA for its ID NOW COVID-19 diagnostic test
in March 2020, and Abbott quickly marketed approximately 600,000 tests.35 On April 16, 2020,
individuals began to report that Abbott's FDA-authorized test administration instructions could
lead to a number of false negative results.3 6
Worse yet, on May 12, 2020, researchers at New York University Langone Health reported
that Abbott's test, which had been used for months by multiple government agencies including the
White House, missed 480% of positive cases of COVID-19 that other devices detected.3 7 Abbott
defended its device, contending that that the 1.8 million ID NOW tests that the company sent to
market had a reported rate of 0.02% false negatives. 38 The FDA seemed skeptical. In fact, on
May 14, 2020, the agency issued a public advisory informing the public about the accuracy
concerns with Abbott's ID NOW COVID-19 diagnostic test. 39 At the time of that announcement,

32 Matthew Herper, Rapid coronavirus test may miss infections in some situations, STAT (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www. statnews.com/2020/04/ 16/rapid-coronavirus-test-commonly-used-in-u-s-may-miss-infections-in-somesituations/.

33
34

Id.
Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

Alex
Keown, Abbott Questions Results of NYU Study, BIOSPACE (May
14,
https://www.biospace. com/article/nyu-study-raises-concerns-over-accuracy-of-abbott-s-rapid-covid- 19-testcompany-questions-results/.
37

2020),

3

8 Id.
&

39 FDA Informs Public About PossibleAccuracy Concerns with Abbott ID NOW Point-of-Care Test, U.S. FOOD
DRUG ADMIN. (May 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19update-fda-informs-public-about-possible-accuracy-concerns-abbott-id-now-point (last visited Jun. 9, 2020).
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the FDA had received at least fifteen adverse event reports concerning the Abbott ID NOW
device. 40
Former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottieb shared concerns with the Abbott ID NOW
device. 4 1 On May 10, during an interview with Face the Nation, Commissioner Gottieb said in a
setting like the West Wing when testing people who are asymptomatic "you want a very sensitive
test." 42 Gottieb warned the White House "[t]here's machines that are more accurate than that
Abbott machine, like the GeneXpert. They take a little longer to perform the test. The reason why
the White House prefers the Abbott machine is it gives a result in five to 15 minutes. GeneXpert
takes about 45 minutes." 43 Nonetheless, the White House kept using Abbott's ID Now test for those
coming in contact with Trump, and for the president's own testing. 44
Months following these reports, the Trump administration proceeded, amid the COVID-19
pandemic, with "an aggressive campaign schedule, including large events at which the president
has appeared indoors, maskless, and in close proximity to other attendees." 4 5 President Trump's
"only precaution [against COVID-19] has been the frequent use of Abbott's ID NOW diagnostic
test: West Wing staffers, guests, and reporters have been required to take rapid Covid-19 tests
upon entering White House grounds, but little else." The end result? On October 2, 2020, President
Trump, First Lady Melania Trump, and a growing number of White House official tested positive

40

Id.
41 Greg Slabodkin, Gottlieb questions White House reliance
on Abbott test, MEDTECH DivE (Oct. 5, 2020),
https: //www.medtechdive.com/news/gottlieb-calls-into-question-white-house-use-of-abbott-rapid-covid-19test/586388/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45 Lev Facher,
Why the White House' testing-only strategy fell short, STAT, (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www. statnews.com/2020/10/02/why-the-white-houses-testing-only-strategy-to-shield-trump-from-covid-19fell-short/.
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for the coronavirus. 46 As Dr. Meagan Ranney, an emergency medicine physician at Brown
University, explained, "It seems the White House put all their eggs in one basket: testing, [b]ut
there is no single strategy, no single thing we can do to be safe. It has to be multimodal."

47

During a press briefing on April 23, Vice President Mike Pence offered "encouraging
news" about commercial laboratory production of COVID-19 diagnostic tests.4 8 "As states have
been engaging commercial labs at a higher level across the country, yesterday our commercial lab
system did more than 100,000 tests in a single day.

So, we're beginning to activate all of the

capacity," he said. 49 The Vice President specifically celebrated the launch of "TestIowa," a publicprivate partnership that was poised to "triple testing capacity" in the Buckeye State. 50
Test Iowa was the second statewide testing program launched by a group of Utah tech
companies." Test Iowa's predecessor, TestUtah, had procured thousands of diagnostic tests from
Co-Diagnostics, a small, publicly-traded company based in Salt Lake City." Co-Diagnostics was
permitted to sell its COVID-19 under the FDA's lenient self-validation rules.53 While none of
TestUtah's initiative leaders "knew anything about lab testing," they proceeded to launch a
statewide testing operation in a matter of a few weeks.5 4

46

47

1d.

1d.

Robert P. Baird, How Utah's Tech Industry Tried to Disrupt Coronavirus Testing, THE NEW
YORKER (Jun. 13,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/how-utahs-tech-industry-tried-to-disrupt-coronavirustesting.
48

Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vicepresident-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-31/.
49

50

Id.

51

Baird, supra note 48.

52

Id.

53 Id.

54

Id.
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The Salt Lake Tribune soon reported an expose about the accuracy of TestUtah's COVID19 diagnostic tests."

Data obtained by the Tribune demonstrated that the positive rate for

TestUtah's patients with COVID-19 like symptoms was less than half that of other test providers. 56
Bert Lopansri, an infectious-disease doctor at Utah-based Intermountain Healthcare, called the
news ".

.

. a potential public health disaster that will be compounded by the fact that they are

constantly promoting themselves publicly."" "What alarms me the most is that they are expanding
collection and testing with these unknowns about how their test performs.

. .

. [this] is not the time

for amateurs to learn," he said.58
The Governor of Iowa nonetheless launched TestIowa on April 21, 2020.59 He claimed that
the initiative "will make available five hundred and forty thousand [COVID-19 diagnostic] tests,
to increase the state's testing capacity by up to three thousand additional tests per day." 60 The
initiative, however, did not go according to plan. In fact, local Iowa municipalities have demanded
an investigation into TestIowa, citing "questions about the number of tests performed, the accuracy
of those tests, the secrecy surrounding the tests and results, long wait times for results and faulty
equipment."61

55 Erin Alberty & Nate Carlisle, 'This is a potential public health disaster: 'COVID-19 results from TestUtah.com are
raising questions, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/04/30/this-ispotential-public/ (last visited Jun. 17, 2020).
Erin Alberty, TestUtah's lab for COVID-19 testing is not in compliance with federal requirements,
regulators find,
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Jun. 4, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/06/04/testutahs-lab-covid/
(last visited
Jun. 17, 2020).
56

57 Baird, supra note 48.
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id.

Adam Carros, Iowa lawmakers call for investigation of Test Iowa, ABC KCRG (May 28,
2020),

https://www.kcrg.com/2020/05/28/iowa-lawmakers-call-for-investigation-of-test-iowa/

(last visited June 17, 2020).
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In addition to diagnostic tests, antibody tests-also known as serological tests-are a key
tool in managing a viral pandemic. 62 Antibody tests can help identify individuals who have been
infected and developed antibodies that may protect from future infection as well as those that
remain at risk. 63 Furthermore, they can incentivize individuals with COVID-19 antibodies to
donate blood for the manufacture of convalescent plasma, an investigational product that can assist
patients with serious COVID-19 illness. 64 Like diagnostic test results, it is crucial that antibody
tests are accurate. 65
In mid-March, 2020, FDA issued guidance stating that it would not intervene when
COVID-19 antibody test manufacturers market or use their own antibody tests without prior FDA
review so long as: (1) the manufacture validates its own tests, (2) the manufacturer notifies FDA
that its tests have been validated, and (3) the tests are labeled appropriately, that is, states that the
tests are not to be used as the sole basis of a COVID-19 diagnosis. 66 Unsurprisingly, device
manufacturers flooded the market with hundreds of antibody tests that varied wildly in accuracy. 67
A local news story from Detroit, Michigan reported that approximately 70 percent of the
non-FDA-approved antibody tests from five different companies provided inconsistent results. 68

See Office of the Commissioner, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Serological Test Validation and Education
Efforts, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Apr.
18,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-serological-test-validation-and-education-efforts (last visited Jun. 9,
2020) [hereinafter Antibody Statement]; see also LastWeekTonight, supra note 14.
62

63 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. supra note 62.
64

1d.

65

See LastWeekTonight, supra note 14.

66

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. supra note 62.

67 Kevin McCoy, et. al, Coronavirusantibody tests are available aroundthe country. Here'swhy they may provide a

false

sense
of
security.,
USA
TODAY
(May
8,
2020),
https: //www.usatoday. com/story/news/investigations/2020/05/07/coronavirms-antibody-testing-doesnt-yet-provideanswers-immunity/3065105001/ (last visited June 9, 2020).
68

Frank McGeorge Ainsworth, Accuracy concerns arise afterFDA allows COVID-19 antibody tests to be soldwithout

authorization, WSLS (May 1, 2020), https://www.wsls.com/news/2020/05/01/accuracy-concerns-arise-after-fdaallows-covid-19-antibody-tests-to-be-sold-without-authorization/ (last visited June 9, 2020).
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Dr. Frank McGeorge, Detroit Local 4's medical expert, reported that FDA only had authorized
eight antibody tests for use out of the 158 tests that were on the market as of May 1, 2020.69 At the
time, twenty-four additional labs were conducting validation testing of their own antibody tests
and intended to market those products without FDA review. 70
A similar tale unfolded in Aspen, Colorado. There, local county officials purchased 20,000
antibody tests from a Chinese company, Anhui DeepBlue Medical Technology, to track COVID19.71 While the company claimed its devices were FDA-authorized, Aspen's own validation trials
revealed that the tests were approximately 20% accurate in detecting COVID-19 antibodies.7 2
These examples suggest why the FDA recently changed course.

On May 4, 2020, the

agency issued revised guidance that require diagnostic manufacturers to submit EUA requests,
accompanied by internal validation data, to FDA within ten business days of the date of validation
testing or from the date of the issuance of the new guidance, whichever is later.73 Unfortunately,
the damaged has already been done. "The[se] tests .

.

. are being used to make life-and-death

decisions. A false positive can lead people to believe they are immune to COVID-19 and therefore
invincible, when in fact they may both be vulnerable to infection and capable of spreading the
infection." 7 4 Needless to say, inaccurate test results can devastate public health containment
strategies in the midst of a pandemic.
69

Id.

7

0 Id.

Christie Aschwaden, Antibody Tests Were Hailed as a Way to End Lockdowns. They're Causing Confusion
Instead,
TIME (May 27, 2020), https://time.com/5842978/covid-19-antibody-testing-concerns/ (last visited June 9, 2020).
71

72

Id.

73 Office of the Commissioner, Insight into FDA's Revised Policy on Antibody Tests: Prioritizing Access and
Accuracy, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/insight-fdas-revisedpolicy-antibody-tests-prioritizing-access-and-accuracy (last visited Jun. 9, 2020).
?4

FDA

is

wrong

on

self-validation

of

COVID-19

tests,

BIOCENTURY

https://www.biocentury.com/article/305016/fda-is-wrong-on-self-validation-of-covid-19-tests
2020).

(Apr.

25,

2020),

(last visited June 9,
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On March 17, 2020, Secretary Azar declared COVID-19 a public health emergency
pursuant to the Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act effective Feb. 4, 2020.75
Under the PREP Act, the Secretary has the authority to extend near-blanket immunity from liability
to manufacturers, distributors, and administrators of medical devices and other medical products
that are meant to counteract the COVID-19 pandemic.7 6 The PREP Act contains just a single
exception to its exceptionally broad immunity provision: it does not insulate a defendant from
"willful misconduct." 7 7 The Act also created a federally-funded, no-fault compensation scheme
for those injured by covered products."
A week later, Secretary Azar sent a letter to state governors urging them to extend civil
immunity from medical liability to health care professionals treating COVID-19 patients.7 9 "For
health care professionals to feel comfortable serving in expanded capacities on the frontlines of
the COVID-19 emergency, it is imperative that they feel shielded from medical tort liability." 80 In
response, the Pennsylvania Governor issued an executive order declaring that any "individual
holding a license, certificate, registration, or certification to practice a health care profession or

See Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures
Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15198, 15203 (March 17, 2020); Michael J. Werner, et.al., PREP Act: Liability
Protection Is Available During COVID-19 Pandemic, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (May 18, 2020),
https: //www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/prep-act-liability-protection-is-available-during-covidl9pandemic (last visited June 14, 2020).
71

See Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (Dec. 30, 2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2020)); see also Werner, supra note 75.
76

7?

See § 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(c).

78

Werner, supra note 75.

79 Benjamin J. McMichael, et. al., COVID-19 And State Medical Liability Immunity, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14,

2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200508.885890/full/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2020).
80 Letter from Alex Azar, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, to Governors on Lifting Restrictions
to Extend the Capacity of the Health Care Workforce During the COVID-19 National Emergency (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/509613 9/Governor%20Letter%20from%20Azar,%20March%2024%20 %20DeIdentified.pdf; Dale C. Van Demark & Emma J. Chapman, SecretaryAzar Calls on Governors to Modify Regulations
to
Expand
Healthcare
Workforce,
MCDERMOTT
WILL
&
EMERY
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.mwe. com/insights/secretary-azar-calls-on-governors-to-modify-regulations-to-expand-healthcareworkforce/.

12

occupation in Pennsylvania shall not be liable for the death or injury to a person arising from
emergency or disaster services activities related to the outbreak." 8 1 LeadingAge PA, a
Pennsylvania nonprofit nursing home association, quickly dissented to the Governor's order,
declaring "[I]t is not enough. We remain shocked and dumbfounded on why this administration
continues to ignore the needs of Pennsylvania's nursing facilities and health care providers; they
are in the epicenter of this pandemic and providers need protection in the form of immunity."

2

Pennsylvania is not alone. As of May 14, 2020, thirty-six states have issued orders extending some
form of civil immunity to healthcare providers and other parties currently combating the COVID19 pandemic. 83
As of this writing, the United States has 2.13 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and
COVID-19 death count that exceeds 117,000 individuals.8 4 COVID-19 has exposed "the structural
underpinnings and the failures of our society." 8 5 The United States has the largest gross domestic
product in the world, yet Americans are burdened with a myriad of chronic health care conditions
that enhance their risk of developing severe and deadly COVID-19 complications. 86 The U.S.
spends twice as much on health care as other high-income countries, but fails to produce healthier

Gov. Wolf Signs Executive Order to Provide Civil Immunity for Health Care Providers, GOVERNOR TOM WOLF
(May 6, 2020), https://www.govemor.pa.gov/newsroom/gov-wolf-signs-executive-order-to-provide-civil-immunityfor-health-care-providers/ (last visited Jun 14, 2020); Caroline J. Berdzik & Jonathan L. Berkowitz, Pennsylvania
Executive Order Affords COVID-19 Civil Liability Immunity to Health Care Practitioners, But Not Facilities,
GOLDBERG
SEGALLA
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.goldbergsegalla.com/news-andknowledge/knowledge/pennsylvania-executive-order-affords-covid- 1 9-civil-liability-immunity-to-health-carepractitioners-but-not-facilities.
81

82

Berdzik, supra note 81.

83

McMichael, supra note 79.

See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the U.S., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited Jun. 14, 2020).
84

85 Erin Schumaker, How COVID-19 is exposing -- and widening -- cracks in the US health system, ABC NEws

(May

8, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/covid-19-exposing-cracks-us-health-system-experts/story?id=70408044
(last visited Jun. 14, 2020).
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citizens.8 7 COVID-19 also has illuminated the stark inequalities that exists between white, uppermiddle class Americans and their less well-resourced minority neighbors.8 8
The pandemic has created a perfect storm for unprecedented and litigation-provoking
health harms. 89 For example, in rural areas of Texas, "small hospitals do not have test kits, and
central labs for testing samples are hours away. That means hospitals will be unable to conclusively
determine whether they have people with COVID-19." 90 Nationwide, hospitals lack the resources
appropriately treat the influx of COVID-19 patients.91 As Johns Hopkins University professor of
health policy and management Gerald Anderson has explained, hospitals "don't have the capacity
to deal with a massive influx of patients and keep them isolated." 92

..

History demonstrates that pandemics test the resiliency of a society. During a public health
emergency, federal, state, and local governments must make decisions to quickly address the
spread of infectious disease and take steps to protect individuals from liability. The question here

87 1d.

Id. A study by New York University's Furman Center, a group which studies urban policy, found that "strongest
neighborhood factors linked to high COVID-19 rates were having a large share of black and Hispanic residents; having
a high proportion of overcrowded apartments and having a large share of residents without college degrees." Erin
Schumaker, In NYC, "starkcontrast" in COVID-19 infection rates based on education and race, ABC NEWS (Apr.
10, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/nyc-stark-contrast-covid-19-infection-rates-based/story?id=69920706 (last
visited Jun. 14, 2020). Moreover, since college-educated workers are more likely to be able to work remotely than
people without a college education, people without degrees are at higher risk for contracting COVID-19. See Workers
who could work at home, did work at home, and were paidfor work at home, by selectedcharacteristics, averagesfor
the period 2017-2018, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/flex2.t01.htm
(last visited Jun. 14, 2020); Schumaker, supra note 64. According to a study by the Economic Policy Institute, fewer
than 1 in 5 black workers and 1 in 6 Hispanic workers are able to work remotely. See Elise Gould and Heidi Shierholz,
Not everybody can work from home: Black and Hispanic workers are much less likely to be able to telework,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTIT. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/black-and-hispanic-workers-are-much-lesslikely-to-be-able-to-work-from-home/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2020). These are just a few examples of how COVID-19
disproportionality impacts communities of color.
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McMichael, supra note 79.

Christopher Rowl et al., U.S. health system is showing why it's not readyfor a coronaviruspandemic, WASH. POST
(Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-us-health-system-is-showing-why-its-notready-for-a-coronavirus-pandemic/2020/03/04/7c307bb4-5d61-1lea-b29b-9db42f7803a7_story.html
(last visited
Jun. 14, 2020).
90
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Id.

92

Id.
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is a simple one: when does the extension of immunity go too far and create perverse incentives?
In addition to medical device manufactures and health care professionals, a number of other
interest groups, like small businesses and universities, are calling for immunity protection. 93 U.S.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and House of Representatives minority leader Kevin
McCarthy have demand that "Americans on the front lines of this fight . . . receive strong
protections from frivolous lawsuits."9 4
Many Americans are out and about on the streets with a newfound freedom because they
believe they are positive for COVID-19 antibodies and, thus, immune to infection. As the Abbott
Labs and similar examples demonstrate, however, there is a high likelihood that their test results
are inaccurate. What if these individuals with faulty test results contract COVID-19 symptoms
and refuse to seek health care treatment because they mistakenly believe that they are immune?
How many other people are at being infected by such individuals? Do individuals who have
received faulty test results have comorbidities that may increase their chances of developing severe
complications from COVID-19 infection?
There is little question that individuals will suffer harm as a result as the result of the
inaccurate information they received from the wildly inaccurate diagnostic and antibody tests
currently on the marker. In the American adjudication system, the general rule is that an individual
is permitted to file a cause of action to be made whole when they are negligently injured by another.
That rule, however, has been suspended as the result of the HHS Secretary's declaration of a

93

See, e.g., U.S. Republicans push for coronavirus lawsuit immunity for business,

REUTERS

(May 1, 2020),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-congress-idUSKBN22D5MG (last visited June 14, 2020);
Abigail Abrams, "A Licensefor Neglect." NursingHomes Are Seeking, and Winning ImmunityAmid the Coronavirus
Pandemic, TIMvE (May 14, 2020), https://time.com/5835228/nursing-homes-legal-immunity-coronavirus/ (last visited
June 14, 2020); Colleges seek protection from lawsuits if they reopen, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 15, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/15/colleges-seek-protection-lawsuits-if-they-reopen
(last visited Jun.
14, 2020).
94 REUTERS, supra note 93.
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COVID-19 public health emergency pursuant to the PREP Act.

As things currently stand,

therefore, device manufactures are permitted net billions of dollars in revenue from their COVID19 devices,

9 5 while

Americans who are injured by those devices will simply have no legal recourse

whatsoever. This paper proposes various reforms designed to mitigate these problems.
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the history of FDA's authority to
regulate medical devices before and after the enactment of the Public Health Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act of 2005,96 and provides an overview of the current FDA
regulatory structure applicable to EUA medical devices in the context of COVID-19. Part II shines
a light on two cases that illustrate the breadth and scope of national public health emergency claim
preemption and immunity.

Part III concludes the paper by proposing a number of novel

recommendations aimed at ensuring that the FDA lives up to its mission to protect and advance
the public health during a public health emergency.

Part I: An Overview
This Part of the paper provides a broad overview of the legislative history of the key
American public health emergency statutes: Project BioShield Act of 2004, the PREP Act, and the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013. It then explains the
development of the modern preemption doctrine that applies to FDA-regulated medical devices.
This Part concludes by examining the breadth and scope of civil suit liability applicable to device
manufacturers in the context of COVID-19.

95 See, e.g., Abbott Reports First-Quarter 2020 Results, ABBOTT LAB'YS, https://abbott.mediaroom.com/2020-04-16-

Abbott-Reports-First-Quarter-2020-Results (last visited Jun.15, 2020).
See Office of the Commissioner, MCM-Related Counterterrorism Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-fmmework/mcmrelated-counterterrorism-legislation (last visited May 23, 2020).
96
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1. Legislative History
a. ProjectBioShield Act of 2004
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, anonymously-mailed letters laced with anthrax were sent to individuals throughout the country. 97 These threats
prompted President George W. Bush to propose Project BioShield to enhance the nation's
countermeasures aimed at potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
terrorism agents. 98 During his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced his
request for "almost $6 billion to quickly make available effective vaccines and treatments against
agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague." 9 9
The 108th Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, the Project BioShield Act
of 2004.100 The law: (1) created flexible pathways for the procurement and award of research
grants related to the development of new countermeasures against CBRN terrorism agents; (2)
granted the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) the discretion to expedite the award
of countermeasures-related research grants; (3) guaranteed the purchase of new, successful CBRN
countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS); and (4) required the DHHS Secretary
to submit annual reports to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) detailing the agency's

97 Aidan McCarty, Changes in U.S. Biosecurity Following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks, 9 J. BIOTERRORISM
BIODEFENSE 1-3 (2018).
98

&

exercise of its authorities granted in the Act. 101 The Act required the GAO, in turn, to issue a four-

Frank Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21507, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: PURPOSES AND AUTHORITIES 1 (2009).

99 Key Initiatives in the President's State of the Union Message, THE WHITE HOUSE (2003), https://georgewbush(last visited May 22, 2020).
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-14.html

100 Gottron, supra note 98, at 1.
101 Megan O'Reilly, The FailuresofProjectBioShield & CongressionalAttempts to Remedy It, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 503, 504-05 (2007).
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year report to assess the Act's effectiveness

and provide recommendations concerning its

shortfalls."12
Project BioShield also amended Section 564 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
to create Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). 10 3 This authority allows the FDA Commissioner
to authorize the use of unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical
products during a qualified public health emergency.

10 4

FDA may issue an EUA for specific

medical countermeasures (MCM) if statutory and other criteria regarding emergency conditions
are satisfied. 105 Prior to Project BioShield, FDA did not have adequate pathways to authorize the
use of unapproved medical products during public health emergencies.

106

There was-and

remains-a process by which an interested party may submit an Investigational New Drug (IND)
Application for an experimental drug that shows promise to treat serious or immediately lifethreatening condition. 107 That pathway, however, is limited to a select number of individuals and,
therefore, precludes FDA from streamlining the mass marketing of MCMs. 108
Project BioShield also authorizes the government to finance the procurement of MCMs for
the SNS.

10 9

Prior to awarding an MCM contract, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

102 1d.
Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (July 21, 2004) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb3(a)(1) (2020)).
103

104

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1).

105

§ 360bbb-3(a)(1).

106 Food and Drug Law Institute (FDLI), FDA's Recent COVID-19 Guidance Facilitating ExpandedAccess to Certain
Medical Products, FDLI (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.fdli.org/2020/04/fdas-recent-covid-19-guidances-facilitatingexpanded-access-to-certain-medical-products/ [hereinafter FDLI Webinar].
107 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34; Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drug-indapplication (last visited May 23, 2020).
108

FDLI Webinar, supra note 106.

109

O'Reilly, supra note 101, at 505.
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must make a "material threat determination," evaluate the public health consequences of the threat,
and determine which MCMs are needed to address the threat. MCM manufacturers must provide
the government with reasonable assurance that the desired MCMs will be available in "sufficient
quantities" and approved or cleared by FDA."

0

While the drug and device manufacturing industries took issue with several aspects of
Project BioShield, their greatest concern was the Act's lack of an indemnity provision.I Due to
the higher risk of liability associated with the development and marketing of MCMs,
manufacturers were disincentivized from participating in the program.1 1 2 For example, the CEO
of AVANT Immunotherapeutic stated that the company "[could]

not afford to risk [its]

stockholders' investments and employees' livelihoods by venturing into the biodefense realm
where large portions of the population will be inoculated in a program of administration over which
[it] [had] little or no control."" 3 Congress passed the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act of 2005 (PREP Act) to address these indemnity concerns.1 1 4

"OId.
111 Id.

at 505-06.

Id.; see also Angela Marino, The Cost of A Countermeasure:The Expansive Liability Protection of the Public
Readiness and Emergency PreparednessAct of 2005, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 203 (2009) ("Under the
[FDA] regulations announced in conjunction with the Project BioShield Act, bioterrorism defense products may be
approved without completing the full FDA testing and approval process. Side effects and injuries that remain
undiscovered during the limited testing period may become apparent only after use by the general public. It is therefore
reasonable for pharmaceutical manufacturers to insist on adequate liability protection before entering the biodefense
market.").
112

113 John Kureczka, Martin Associates, Project BioShield: Consistentfinancing, markets, indemnity for biodefense
vaccine developers needed, EUREKALERT!
(2003),
http://www.eurekalert.org/pubreleases/2003-04/kapbc040303.php (last visited May 23, 2020).
114

See Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), PublicReadiness andEmergency Preparedness

Act

Fact

Sheet,

EMERGENCY

USE

AUTHORIZATION

TOOLKIT

(2011),

https://www.astho. org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Use-AuthorizationToolkit/Public-Readiness-and-Emergency-Preparedness-Act-Fact-Sheet/ (last visited May 23, 2020).
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b. PublicReadiness and Emergency PreparednessAct of 2005 (PREPAct)
The PREP Act authorizes the HHS Secretary to issue a declaration that provides covered
entities immunity from tort liability for claims of loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from administration or use of MCMs against diseases or other public health emergency
threats."

5

The Secretary may issue a PREP Act declaration where "a disease or other health

condition or other threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, or . . . there is a credible
risk that the disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency." 1 16 The
Secretary has broad discretion and her determination is not subject to judicial review.1 1 7
Once a declaration is made, covered entities may include manufacturers, distributors,
program planners (i.e., individuals and entities involved in planning and administering programs
for the distribution of countermeasures), and qualified persons who prescribe, administer, or
dispense countermeasures (i.e., healthcare and other providers) at the Secretary's discretion.

8

In

the case of a device manufacturers and distributors, immunity applies regardless of whether the
MCM was administered or used by an individual.1 19 In the case of program planners or qualified

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B) ("The immunity applies to any claim for loss that has a causal relationship with the
administration to or use by an individual of a covered countermeasure, including a causal relationship with the design,
development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing,
promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of such
countermeasure."); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 96.
115

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1). The PREP Act declaration must include: (1) the categories of diseases, health
conditions, or threats to health for which the Secretary recommends the administration or use of the countermeasure;
(2) the periods during which the indemnification provisions will be in effect; (3) the populations of individuals for
which the indemnification provisions will be in effect; (4) the geographic areas for which the indemnification
provisions will be in effect; and (5) whether the indemnification provisions will be effective only as to a particular
means of distribution for obtaining the countermeasure. See id. § 247d-6d(b)(2).
116

"1

§ 247-6d(b)(7).

118

§ 247-6d(h)(2). The United States, agents, and employees of any of these entities or persons are also covered

persons. Id.; see also ASTHO, supra note 114.
See 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d(a)(4)(A); contra Casabiancav. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 112790/10, 2014
WL 10413521,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2014) (holding the PREP Act inapplicable because the defendant hospital never
administered a MCM).
119

20

persons, the same immunity applies even if those individuals lose their status as qualified
persons. 120 If the entity or person reasonably could have believed, under the current, emergent
circumstances, that they were covered person, they also are immune from liability 12 1
The Secretary also has the exclusive authority to determine which products constitute
"covered countermeasures." 122 The PREP Act specifies three general types of "covered
countermeasures:"

(1)

a qualified

"pandemic

or epidemic

product";

(2)

a "security

countermeasure"; and (3) a drug, biological product, or device that the FDA has authorized for
emergency use. 123 These covered countermeasures generally include products "manufactured,
used, designated, developed, modified, licensed, or procured .

.

. to diagnose, mitigate, prevent,

treat, or cure a pandemic or epidemic; or to limit the harm such pandemic or epidemic might
otherwise cause." 124 The PREP Act indemnity provisions limit an injured individual's ability to
recover for losses associated with the use of a covered MCM. 125 In addition, it preempts states
from providing any alternate pathway to recover for such losses. 12 6
The is a singular exception to the PREP Act's broad immunity provisions. Injured
individuals are permitted to bring a federal cause of action against covered persons or entities for

120

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d(a)(4)(B).

121

Id.

122

Marino, supra note 112, at 206.

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1); see also The PREP Act and COVID-19: Limiting Liability for Medical
Countermeasures, CRS LEGAL SIDEBAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., LSB10443, 2 (2020).
123

124

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(A), (7)(A)(i); see also Marino, supra note 112, at 206.

See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2) ("The term 'loss' means any type of loss, including-- death; physical, mental, or
emotional injury, illness, disability, or condition; fear of physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, disability, or
condition, including any need for medical monitoring; and loss of or damage to property, including business
interruptionloss.").
125

§ 247d-6d(b)(8). States are preempted from passing or enforcing any legislation that is conflicts with these
indemnity provisions or "relates to the design, development, clinical testing or investigation, formulation,
manufacture, distribution, sale, donation, purchase, marketing, promotion, packaging, labeling, licensing, use, any
other aspect of safety or efficacy, or the prescribing, dispensing, or administrationby qualified persons of the covered
countermeasure, or to any matter included in a requirement applicable to the covered countermeasure." Id.
126
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death or serious injury caused by "willful misconduct"-with important caveats. 12 7 Covered
persons or entities that act in accordance

"with applicable

directions, guidelines,

or

recommendations by the Secretary regarding the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure" will not be found to have engaged in "willful misconduct."

128

A state or local

health authority who is "provided with notice of information regarding serious physical injury or
death from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure" also is exempt from this
standard. 129 The Act further precludes an injured individual from bringing a cause of action for
willful misconduct against manufactures and distributors of covered MCMs that are subject to
regulation by PREP or the FDCA, unless and until those entities have been successfully prosecuted
by the government.13 0 As a result, it is very difficult for injured individuals to successfully recover
for injuries sustained from the use of covered MCMs.
The PREP Act also established the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program
(CICP).1 3 1 Under CICP, individuals who suffer death or serious physical injury directly caused by
use of a covered countermeasure may receive reimbursement for reasonable medical expenses,
loss of employment income, and, in the case of death of the injured person, survivor benefits. 13 2

127

See § 247d-6d(c) (" . .

128

§ 247d-6d(c).

the term 'willful misconduct' "willful misconduct" shall . . denote an act or omission that
is taken -- (i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and
(iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh
the benefit").
12 9

Id.

130

Marino, supra note 112, at 208.

131

U.S. Health Resources

& Services

Administration (HRSA),

ABOUT THE COUNTERMEASURES

INJURY

COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/about/index.html (last visited May 23, 2020). The CICP
is different from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, a similar no-fault compensation program that
compensates individuals found to be injured by certain vaccines. See Health Resources & Services Administration
(HRSA), ABOUT THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-

compensation/about/index.html (last visited May 23, 2020).
132

CRS Legal Sidebar, supra note 123, at 4.
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Compensation under CICP, however, includes important limitations. 13 3 First, an injured
individual must first exhaust all available remedies in order to qualify for CICP fund eligibility. 3 4
Second, CICP has a one-year filing deadline from the date of administration or use of the covered
MCM that might have caused their injury.135 Third, serious physical injuries under CICP are
limited to those that warrant hospitalization or lead to a significant loss of function or disability. 136
Most importantly, CICP funding is subject to legislative appropriations and, as such, Congress
may "change the program's parameters, if appropriate under the circumstances then prevailing,
prior to the expenditure of federal taxpayer funds." 13 1 Congress funds CICP awards through
emergency appropriations to the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund. 138
In addition to the immunity protections provided by the PREP Act and general preemption
doctrine, states have extended immunity for health care providers in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. 139 Since mid-March, at least 33 states currently offer some level of immunity to
treatment providers and/or facilities.14 0
The scope of these state immunity protections varies. 14 1 For example, some jurisdictions
confer broad immunity that extends to a wide range of health care providers and facilities. Under
Wisconsin law, for example,

133

Marino, supra note 112, at 208-11.

134

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d).

U.S. Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA), How TO FILE AND DEADLINE FOR
FILING (2017),
https://www.hrsa.gov/get-health-care/conditions/counter-measures-comp/howtofile.html
(last visited May 23, 2020).
135

136 CRS LEGAL SIDEBAR, supra note 123, at 4.
137

Marino, supra note 112, at 214.

138

CRS LEGAL SIDEBAR, supra note 123,

at 4.

See Buckner Wellford & Leslie Yohey, COVID-19 Health Care Provider Immunity Update, BAKER DONELSON
(May 14, 2020), https://www.bakerdonelson.com/covid-19-health-care-provider-immunity-update.
139

140 Id.
141
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any health care professional, health care provider, or employee, agent, or contractor
of a health care professional or health care provider is immune from civil liability
for the death of or injury to any individual or any damages caused by actions or
omissions that . .
(a) . . . is committed while the professional, provider, employee, agent, or
contractor is providing services during the state of emergency
(b) .

.

. relate to health services provided or not provided in good faith or are

substantially consistent with . . . Any direction, guidance, recommendation, or
other statement made by a federal, state, or local official to address or in
response to [COVID-19] . . . relied upon in good faith.142
Wisconsin does not, however, provide immunity for acts or omissions that involve reckless,
wanton, or intentional misconduct. 143
In Rhode Island, Governor Gina Raimondo issued an executive order which designates all
workers and organizations providing care at hospitals and nursing facilities "disaster response
workers" entitled to immunity. 14 4 The executive order specifically states that immunity only
applies to providers caring for patients who are reasonably suspected or confirmed to have
COVID-19 and does not extend "to such persons and organizations, including health care workers,
for negligence that occurs in the course of providing patient care to patients without COVID-19
whose care has not been altered by the existence of this disaster emergency."145

142

WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.4801 (West 2020); see also Wellford, supra note 139.

143

WIs STAT. ANN.

§ 895.4801(c) (West 2020).

144 See R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://govemor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-20-

21.pdf (last visited Jun. 15, 2020).
145

Id
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Despite these additional immunity protections, government officials and interest groups
continue to push for more immunity. 14 6 On May 13, 2020, CBS Dallas-Fort Worth 21 reported
that U.S. Senator John Cornyn has circulated a bill that would immunize people and entities,
including health care providers, who are providing "business services," including health care
services, from liability for personal injury resulting from or related to the actual or alleged exposure
to COVID-19. 147 Like other immunity provisions, Senator Cornyn's proposal does not immunize
individuals who engage in gross negligence, willful, or criminal misconduct. 148 "My view is that
we ought to make sure that people who recklessly disregard the safety of others or that engage in
willful conduct, that those are the folks who need to be held accountable," he said. 14 9 Senator
Cornyn's proposal, however, would preempt state laws that provide fewer immunity protections
to health care providers and others providing "business services."150
c. Pandemicand All-Hazards PreparednessReauthorizationAct of 2013 (PAHPRA)
In March 2013, Congress passed, and President Barack Obama signed into law, the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA).15 1 PAHPRA
was intended to "strengthen our Nation's preparedness for public health emergencies involving

146

See Wellford, supra note 139.

See Jack Fink, Sen. John Cornyn DraftingBill On Immunity From COVID-19-Related Lawsuits For Businesses,
Health Care Workers, CBS DALLAS FORT-WORTH 21 (May 13, 2020), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2020/05/13/johncomyn-drafting-bill-immunity-from-covid-19-related-lawsuits-businesses-health-care-workers/.
147

148

See Fink, supra note 147; Wellford, supra note 139.

149

See Fink, supra note 147.

150

Wellford, supra note 139.

See Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-5, 127 Stat. 161
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3a) (2013); see also Brooke Courtney, Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
ReauthorizationAct of 2013 (PAHPRA) Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Authorities: FDA Questions andAnswers
for Public Health Preparedness and Response
Stakeholders
(2014),
https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20190423022943/https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCo
untermeasures/UCM3 80269.pdf.
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[CBRN] agents, as well as emerging infectious disease threats."1 " As such, the legislation
increased the flexibility provided by Project BioShield to support the development of potential
medical countermeasures. 153
1. Statutory Framework of Emergency Use Authorization (EUAs)
Under Section 564 of the FDCA, the FDA Commissioner may, on a temporary basis,
authorize the use of unapproved/uncleared medical products or an unapproved use of an approved
medical product during a public health emergency.1 54 The life cycle of an EUA involves the
following: (1) a determination of an emergency; (2) a declaration of an emergency; (3) a review
of the request for the EUA by the FDA; (4) an issuance of the EUA or denial of the same; and (5)
the termination of the EUA. 155
PAHPRA amended the EUA determination language to provide FDA additional flexibility
in the EUA process. 156 There are at least three ways to trigger EUA authority.1 57 First, the Secretary
of either the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Department of Defense (DoD) may
make a declaration of an emergency or a significant potential for an emergency "involving a
heightened risk of attack with a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents." 158
The DHS Secretary may also identify a "a material threat against the United States population
sufficient to affect national security."

159

Finally, the HHS Secretary may make a determination,

152

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
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See Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013, supra note 151.
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See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3.
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Id. at 6.
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based on either an actual or potential public health emergency, "that affects, or has a significant
potential to affect, national security or the health and security of United States citizens living
abroad, and that involves a [CBRN] agent, or a disease or condition that may be attributable to
such [ ] agents." 160 Once any of these three determinations are issued, the HHS Secretary is
permitted to invoke the agency's EUA powers. 161
FDA starts the process by reviewing requests for EUAs. 162 After Project BioShield was
enacted, the HHS Secretary established a permanent Emergency Use Authorization Working
Group (EUAWG), headed by the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), with
representatives from FDA, DoD, DHS, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and, as appropriate,
participants from other federal agencies, to identify and provide expert consultation on requested
EUAs to FDA prior to and during declared public health emergencies. 163 Once an EUA is
submitted, the ASPR may convene this working group. 164 Based on the ASPR's review of the
information and data submitted to FDA and subsequent to consultation with the Director of NIH
and the Director of CDC, the FDA Commissioner may authorize the EUA for a particular product
that otherwise satisfies the statutory criteria. 165

160

Id.

161
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162
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To qualify for an EUA, a product must satisfy four criteria. 166 First, the CBRN agent
referenced in the EUA declaration must be capable of causing a serious or life-threatening disease
or condition. 167 Second, the medical product manufacturer must provide evidence (including data
from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available) that its product "may be effective"
to prevent, diagnose, or treat the serious or life-threatening disease or condition.16 8 This "may be
effective" standard is lower than the FDA's typical "effectiveness" standard applicable to other
approval and clearance pathways. 169 Third, FDA must assess the potential effectiveness of a
potential EUA product on case-by-case basis through the use of a risk-benefit analysis.1 70 A
product may be awarded an EUA if the FDA Commissioner determines that the known and
potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential

risks under the

circumstances. 171
Fourth and finally, medical products are entitled to EUA only if there is no adequate,
approved, and available alternatives that diagnose, prevent, or treat the disease or condition.

172

If

an EUA application satisfies these four criteria, the FDA Commissioner is empowered to grant the
EUA for its intended use in a public health emergency. 17 3 If the application does not meet these

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b); Office of the Commissioner, Emergency Use Authorization ofMedical Products 7 (Jan.
2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download (last visited May 27, 2020) [hereinafter 2017 Guidance].
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requirements, the MCM manufacturer may look to a different pathway (i.e., IND application) to
provide patients access to the unapproved product during a public health emergency. 17 4
The PAHPRA does not detail the quantity or quality of the data required to support an
EUA. FDA, however, has issued guidance regarding that issue 175 mandating that applicants
provide at least a minimum level of information in support of the product's safety and
effectiveness

17 6

Generally, all applications must include: (1) a description of the product and its

intended uses, (2) a rationale justifying the need for EUA approval, (3) available safety and
efficacy data, and (4) the product's proposed labeling and instructions. 177 The exact type and
amount of data needed to support an EUA varies depending on the public health emergency. 178
FDA anticipates that data from controlled clinical trials will be available to make the
requisite safety showing. 179 If such data is not available for some medical devices (e.g., in vitro
devices), FDA may consider bench testing data.180 FDA understands that effectiveness data is
unlikely to be available and, therefore, it assesses the efficacy of a product candidate on a case-bycase basis.1 81
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17 5

1 d.

176
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7Id.

178

at 11.
at 11-13.

2017 Guidance, supra note 166, at 13.

179 Id.

Id. Non-clinical bench performance testing includes but is not limited to: mechanical and biological engineering
performance (such as fatigue, wear, tensile strength, compression, and burst pressure); bench tests using ex vivo, in
vitro, and in situ animal or human tissue; and animal carcass or human cadaveric testing. See CTR. FOR DEVICES AND
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, Recommended Content and Format ofNon-ClinicalBench Performance Testing Information
in Premarket Submissions: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff 3 (Dec. 20, 2019),
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MCMs eligible for an EUA include both unapproved products and approved products
intended for unapproved uses.1

2

1

Therefore, FDA may apply specific conditions to an EUA to

protect public health. 183 At the minimum, the FDA must provide healthcare professionals
information explaining: (1) that FDA has authorized the emergency use of the product (including
the product name and an explanation of its intended use); (2) the significant known and potential
benefits and risks of the product's emergency use as well as the extent to which such benefits and
risks are unknown; and (3) available alternatives and their benefits and risks, if any. 184 FDA also
is required to provide this information to MCM recipients. 185 While informed consent is typically
required to administer a product under FDA rules, it is not required for EUA products. 186 FDA
must, however, issue conditions for the monitoring and reporting of adverse events to the extent
possible given the circumstances of the emergency for unapproved products. 187
After issuing an EUA, the PAHPRA also empowers FDA to waive otherwise applicable
Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP) (e.g., proper storage or handling requirements),
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Id. § 360bbb-3(e).

183
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2017 Guidance, supra note 166, at 24.
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See 21 C.F.R. § 50; 2017 Guidance, supra note 166, at 24.

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e). Some reports of adverse events may be directed to "predefined mechanisms to capture
adverse event data (e.g., FDA's Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting System (MedWatch) or Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS))." See 2017 Guidance, supra note 166, at 24. However, it is important to
note that currently FDA exempts certain individuals from filing adverse events. For example, the FDA requires device
manufacturers to file an adverse event report with the agency within 30 days of notice that any device may have caused
or contributed to a death or serious injury or has malfunctioned and would be likely to cause or contribute to a death
or serious injury if a malfunction were to occur. See William Martinez, Attack of the Clones: An Examination and
Critique of FDA 's Medical Device Regulatory Scheme, 26 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2021). FDA does not
mandate medical device distributors or healthcare professionals to report adverse events. Id. FDA does demand,
however, that "device user facilities," which include hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, nursing homes,
outpatient diagnostic facilities, and outpatient treatment facilities, file these reports with the device manufacturer. Id.
During the course of a public health emergency, these layers of reporting may be troublesome.
187
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to accommodate emergency response needs.1 88 FDA also may waive Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies (REMS) requirements that would otherwise apply.18 9 Once an EUA has been
issued, it remains in effect throughout the duration of the Secretary's declaration under which it
was authorized unless FDA revokes the EUA. 190
It is important to remember that all MCMs used during a public health emergency,
including those not approved or cleared though the EUA process, are subject to the tort liability
protections granted by the PREP Act. 19 1 Therefore, an injured person that claims harm caused by
EUA medical products is limited to the single cause of action granted by the PREP Act, that is, a
"willful misconduct" claim.19 2 As discussed above, it is exceedingly difficult to succeed on a
willful misconduct claim.
d.

Further liability protections

Federal Preemption of State Law Claims

Case law instructs us that medical device manufacturers have an added layer of liability in
addition to the PREP Act - preemption of state law claims. 193 The following subsections of this

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e)(3). CGMPs are put in place to assure the proper design, monitoring, and control of drug
and device manufacturing processes and facilities. See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Facts About the
Current
Good
Manufacturing
Practices
(CGMPs), U.S.
FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN.
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/pharmaceutical-quality-resources/facts-about-current-good-manufacturing-practicescgmps.
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21 U.S.C. § 355-1(k). REMS are sometimes required by FDA to reduce the occurrence of serious adverse events.
See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FrequentlyAsked Questions (FAQs) aboutREMS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/risk-evaluation-and-mitigation-strategies-rems/frequently-askedquestions-faqs-about-rems. REMS are designed to help reduce the occurrence or severity of a particular serious
adverse event. Id. Once the FDA determines that a REMS is necessary, the drug manufacturer must develop specific
REMS for its product. See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, What's in a REMS?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/risk-evaluation-and-mitigation-strategies-rems/whats-rems. A REMS may include
one or more of the following elements: (1) medication guide (to inform patients about risks); (2) communication plan
(to inform healthcare providers about risks); and (3) implementation system. Id.
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paper provide a brief overview of FDA's scheme for regulating medical devices, and how that
impacts the possible claims that are preempted.
i. Summary of FDA Regulatory Framework ofMedical Devices
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments granted FDA the authority to regulate medical
devices. The statute defines a "device" as:
"any instrument, apparatus, implement,

machine, contrivance,
.

implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . .

intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man . .
[or] intended to affect the structure or any function of the body . .
. 194

The FDA organizes medical devices into three classes (e.g., Class I, II, III) based on the
safety concerns associated with the device and the level of controls needed to provide the FDA
with reasonable assurance of the device's safety and effectiveness.

19 5 Class

I medical devices, like

elastic bandages, present relatively few risks to human health or safety. 196 The FDA subjects Class
I devices to the lowest level of regulatory oversight because those devices: (1) are not purported
to be for use in supporting or sustaining human life or use that is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health; and (2) do not present a potential, unreasonable risk of

194

21 U.S.C. § 321(h).

21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1); see Martinez, supra note 187, at 12; Spenser F. Powell, Changing Our Minds: Reforming
the FDA Medical Device Reclassification Process, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 177, 186 (2018).
195
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REGULATION 211, 213 (Kenneth R. Pina & Wayne L. Pines, eds., 6th ed. 2017).
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illness or injury. 19 7 As a result, a manufacturer's demonstration of compliance with FDA general
controls is sufficient to reasonably assure the agency that the device is safe and effective.198
Class II devices, like infusion pumps, are medical devices for which "general controls alone
are insufficient to ensure their safety and effectiveness." 1 9 9 In addition to general controls, Class
II devices are subject to device-specific special controls.20 0 The FDA subjects the majority of Class
II devices to its 510(k) pre-market notification process. 201 That process requires the manufacturer
to notify FDA of its intent to market a device that is "substantially equivalent" to another device
that FDA has previously cleared or approved for market. 202 The FDA relies heavily on 510(k)
substantial-equivalence review to ensure the safety and effectiveness of Class II devices. 2 03 A
study of FDA 510(k) submissions revealed that more than 80% of 510(k) devices cleared for
market between 1996 and 2009 were Class II devices. 2 04
Class III medical devices, like pacemakers, are devices that present the highest potential
risk to the public and, therefore, are subject to the most stringent regulatory controls.

2 05

In addition

to general and special controls, certain Class III devices are subject to FDA pre-market approval

197

21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).

198 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2019) (defining Class I devices). General controls include the FDA's
requirements for
facility registration, product listing, maintenance of records, labeling, and adherence to current good manufacturing
practices (CGMPs), among other things. Kanovsky, supra note 196, at 213.
199

Kanovsky, supra note 196, at 214.

Id. Special controls include, among other things, performance standards, pre-market data demands, post-market
surveillance, special labelling requirements, and patient registries. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
200

Bonnie Scott, Oversight Overhaul: Eliminating the PremarketReview of Medical Devices and Implementing a
Provider-CenteredPostmarketSurveillance Strategy, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 377, 379 (2011).
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YEARS 85 (2011), htmts:H/doi.org/10.17226/13150
204 Id.
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21 U.S.C. @ 360c(a)(1)(C).

(PMA) to ensure their safety and effectiveness. 206 The applicant must support its PMA application
with valid scientific evidence that demonstrates the safety and efficacy of the device for its
intended use. 2 07 Class III devices are those that are either: (1) for use in supporting or sustaining
human life or a use that is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health; or
(2) present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury. 208 Much like Class II devices,
however, Class III devices are more often than not cleared through the 510(k) pathway. 2 09 For
example, the FDA approved 3,148 Class III devices under 510(k) in 2005.210 That same year, the
FDA approved only 32 Class III devices via the premarket approval process. 21 1
Commentators have argued that the FDA's PMA and 510(k) pathways are inadequate.
This is because faulty or flawed medical devices cleared or approved via these pathways have
injured 1.7 million and killed nearly 83,000 people nationwide. 2 12 As technology advances, device
manufacturers are hyper-incentivized to market new devices as quickly as possible-and before
potential competitors

by any means necessary. 21 1 For example, in 1993, the FDA approved

Medtronic's PMA application for its Transvene ICD Lead System device for use in heart
surgery. 21 4 The FDA approved the device for market distribution within three months of

206
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Medtronic's request and without any clinical trial data.215 Medtronic recalled the medical device
in October 2007-after it had been on the market for 38 months and used in 268,000 worldwide
implantations-because of its propensity to fracture.2 16 In 2010, Medtronic agreed to pay $268
million to settle lawsuits involving the Fidelis Lead device. 217 This example illustrates how
medical devices, even approved through FDA's stringent marketing application, may lead to
deadly results.
Like other medical devices, the FDA classifies in vitro devices (IVD) into Classes I, II, or
III according to the level of regulatory control that is necessary to assure that the product is safe
and effective. 2 18 The classification of an IVD determines the appropriate premarket application
process. 2 19 In the context of COVID-19, IVDs are likely to be considered Class III devices because
of their serious risk potential. 22 0
The safety of an IVD device directly relates to the device's potential to produce false
negative and false positive results. 221 The FDA considers misdiagnosis caused by inaccurate test
results a significant risk if the potential harm to the individual could be life-threatening. 222 As
mentioned before, "the[se] tests .

.

. are being used to make life-and-death decisions.

A false

positive can lead people to believe they are immune to COVID-19 and therefore invincible, when

21

1 d. at 33.

216 1d.
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Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Overview of IVD Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/ivd-regulatory-assistance/overview-ivd-regulation
(last visited Jun. 15, 2020).
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in fact they may both be vulnerable to infection and capable of spreading the infection."2 23 The
FDA acknowledges that a false positive result may lead to unnecessary follow up testing and
unnecessary treatment that can be invasive or have harmful side effects and/or lead to unnecessary
psychological trauma. 22 4 Likewise, false negative results may instigate a delay in treatment and a
false sense of security that could prevent follow-up care and retesting and contribute to the spread
of COVID-19. 225 Therefore, the FDA requires manufacturers of Class III IVDs to support their
PMA applications with valid scientific evidence that demonstrates the safety and efficacy of the
device for its intended use in a non-emergency context. 22 6
As previously noted, Secretary Azar invoked the FDA's Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) applicable to in vitro diagnostics 227 designed to detect and/or diagnose COVID-19 pursuant
to Section 564 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) on February 4, 2020.228 After that
declaration, the FDA Commissioner released policies related to COVID-19 in vitro diagnostic
devices. 22 9 On February 29, 2020, FDA issued guidance that permitted laboratories certified under
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) to "develop, validate, and use

Steve Usdin, FDA is wrong on self-validation of COVID-19 tests, BIOCENTURY (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.biocentury.com/article/305016/fda-is-wrong-on-self-validation-of-covid-19-tests (last visited June 9,
2020).
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In vitro diagnostics tests are performed on blood samples that have been taken from the human body. See Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, In Vitro Diagnostics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/products-and-medical-procedures/vitro-diagnostics (last visited Jun. 9, 2020).
In vitro diagnostics can detect diseases or other conditions and can be used to monitor a person's overall health to help
cure, treat, or prevent diseases. Id.
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diagnostic tests for the SARS-CoV-2 virus, prior to submission of a request for EUA." 230 Under
this policy, CLIA-certified labs are authorized to market a COVID-19 diagnostic test after the lab
validates the test. 2 31 Validation simply means that the lab has determined that the medical device
measures what it is designed to measure.2 32
After a test is self-validated, the manufacturer notifies FDA of its intention to begin
marketing the device. 233 The device manufacturer must submit an EUA application within 15
days. 234 During this period, lab reports must include a statement that the test has been validated
while FDA's review of the test is pending. 235 Moreover, while FDA evaluates the EUA application,
the agency recommends that the lab "obtain confirmation of the first five positive and the first five
negative clinical specimens using an EUA-authorized assay, which may involve sending these ten
specimens to another laboratory for confirmation." 23 6 If the lab cannot obtain such confirmation,
it must notify the FDA.237 If FDA ultimately rejects the EUA application, the lab must cease use

Jeffrey Shapiro, et. al., What Device Manufacturers Need to Know at This Time about FDA's Exercise of
Emergency Authority
in Response to COVID 19, FDA LAW BLOG (Mar. 27,
2020),
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of the diagnostic test and issue "corrected test reports that indicate the prior test result may not be
valid." 238
On three occasions, the FDA issued subsequent guidance addressing issues raised by
commercial laboratories attempting to market their own diagnostic tests. 239 On March 16, 2020,
the FDA rolled out a policy which allowed device companies authorized under state law to develop
their own COVID-19 tests to forgo submission of an EUA for those tests. 240 "A State or territory
choosing to authorize laboratories within that State or territory to develop and perform a test for
COVID-19 would do so under authority of its own State law, and under a process that it establishes.
FDA does not intend to object to the use of such tests for specimen testing where the notification
of SARS-CoV-2 test validation is not submitted to FDA and the laboratory does not submit an
EUA request to FDA, and where instead the State or territory takes responsibility for COVID-19
testing by laboratories in its State during the COVID-19 outbreak." 24 1 The FDA required these
laboratories to notify the FDA of their intention to market state-authorized devices. 242
FDA's March 16, 2020 policy also applies to commercial COVID-19 test kit manufacturers
and distributors. 2 43 Like CLIA-certified laboratories, commercial test kit manufacturers may selfvalidate their own devices and market those products upon successful self-validation. 2 44
Commercial test kit manufacturers also must follow up with an FDA EUA application within 15
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days. 2 45 Unlike the policy applicable to CLIA-certified laboratories, however, commercial test kit
manufacturers do not need to obtain confirmation of the first five positive and negative specimens
by an EUA-authorized

device. 2 46 Instead, the FDA recommends that commercial test

manufacturers post the instructions for use and a summary of the device's performance to their
website. 247
FDA's March 16, 2020 guidance clarified the agency's position on the marketing process
for antibody tests. 24 8 Ultimately, the agency determined that antibody tests did not require the
submission of an EUA. 249 To qualify for this discretion, antibody tests manufacturers must
appropriately validate the product and notify the FDA of its intention to market the device. 25 0 In
addition, each antibody test report must include a number of disclaimers. 2 1
It is important to note that the particular medical device pathway that a device manufacture
uses to get a product to market controls the manufacturer's exposure to tort liability. 252 Under the
MDA, for example, the PMA pathway shields medical device manufactures from state tort claims
under a theory of preemption. 253 Due to this immunity, individuals injured by PMA medical
devices are often left with few options to recover for damages.
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Id. ("[T]he test reports must have the following disclaimers: The test has not been reviewed by the FDA; Negative
results do not rule out SARS-CoV-2 infection, particularly in those who have been in contact with the virus. Followup testing with a molecular diagnostic should be considered to rule out infection in these individuals; Results from
antibody testing should not be used as the sole basis to diagnose or exclude SARS-CoV-2 infection or to inform
infection status; Positive results may be due to past or present infection with non-SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus strains,
such as coronavirus HKU1, NL63, OC43, or 229E").
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ii. MedicalDevice Preemption
Preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the
Constitution and federal laws made pursuant to it are the supreme law of the land. 25 4 Preemption
doctrine invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.2 5 In order to
determine whether a state law is preempted by federal law, therefore, a reviewing court must look
to the statutory text and "identify the domain expressly pre-empted" by such language. 2 56 The
MDA includes an express preemption clause that states:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect
to a device intended for human use any requirement
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter
to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included
in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 25 7
While this language makes clear that Congress intended the MDA to preempt "at least some state
law," it is ambiguous as to which types of medical devices are covered. 2 8 The Supreme Court
clarified the extent of MDA's preemption of medical device claims in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.25 9
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1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: 510(k) Cleared Devices
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme Court held that state tort law claims against a
device manufacturer that parallel federal claims are not preempted by the MDA. 260 In 1987, Lohr
was equipped with a Medtronic Model 4011 pacemaker lead. 26 1 Three years later, Lohr required
emergency surgery after that pacemaker failed. 2 62 Lohr brought a cause of action in Florida state
court against Medtronic on negligence and strict liability theories. 263
Lohr's negligence claim alleged that Medtronic breached the "'duty to use reasonable care
in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the subject pacemaker' in several respects,
including the use of defective materials in the lead and a failure to warn or properly instruct the
plaintiff or her physicians of the tendency of the pacemaker to fail, despite knowledge of other
earlier failures."'

264

Her strict liability claim alleged that the medical device was "in a defective

condition and unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale." 265
Medtronic removed the case to federal district court and subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment. 266 The device manufacturer claimed that Lohr's negligence and strict liability
claims were pre-empted by Section 360k(a) of the MDA. 2 67 The district court denied Medtronic's
motion, concluding that Section 360k(a) did not entirely preempt claims against device
manufacturers.268

260

See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
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Soon after the district court issued that order, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held in a different case that Section 360k preempted certain common-law claims
against medical device manufactures.269 In light of that court of appeals' decision, the Lohr district
court reversed its decision and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. 2 70 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed that dismissal, holding that Lohr's negligence claims were preempted by the
MDA. 2 7 1 It did, however, reverse the district court's determination that the MDA preempted
Lohr's strict liability claims. 272
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.27 3 In an opinion delivered by
Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court concluded that Lohr's claims were not preempted by the MDA
because the statute was not intended to preempt "traditional common law remedies against
manufactures and distributors of defective

devices"

so long

as they parallel federal

requirements.274
The Court placed great weight on the fact that Medtronic's device was cleared though
FDA's 510(k) "substantial equivalence" pathway and not its more stringent PMA process. 275 In
order to preempt state law, state law claims must establish requirements that relate to the safety or
efficacy of medical devices.
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Substantial equivalence, the Court concluded, is: (1) focused on
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equivalence, not safety; and (2) not a requirement but a "general standard" with which a device
manufacturer must comply and, thus, not sufficient to trigger preemption. 277
The take away from Lohr is that state claims are only preempted when the FDA has
established "specific counterpart regulations or .
particular device."

2 78

.

. other specific requirements applicable to a

While the Lohr Court determined the extent of preemption for 510(k) cleared

medical devices, it did not address whether state law claims are preempted for PMA approved
devices. 2 79 That issue was resolved in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
2. Riegel v. Medtronic: PMA Approved Devices
In 1996, Riegel underwent surgery shortly after suffering a heart attack. 280 Riegel's doctor
inserted a Medtronic "Evergreen Balloon Catheter," a PMA-approved Class III device, into his
coronary artery in an attempt to dilate the artery. 2 8 1 The catheter ruptured, which caused a blockage
in Riegel's heart and required him to be rushed into emergency coronary bypass surgery.2 82 Riegel
filed suit in New York federal court alleging that "Medtronic's catheter was designed, labeled, and
manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and that these defects caused
Riegel to suffer severe and permanent injuries." 283 Riegel's complaint contended that Medtronic's
"Evergreen Balloon Catheter," was "designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated
New York common law, and that these defects caused Riegel to suffer severe and permanent
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injuries." 2 84 The district court concluded that the MDA preempted Riegel's claims, which the
Second Circuit affirmed. 285
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed that the MDA
preempted Riegel's state tort claims. 286 The Court noted that the "requirements" lacking in the
Lohr decision were present in this case. 2 87 Unlike the 510(k) pathway, the FDA's PMA process
imposes a number of specific safety requirements on medical devices. 288 In fact, the PMA process
is "focused on safety, not equivalence." 28 9 New York common law, which "requires a
manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved
disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect." 29 0 Thus, the MDA
preempted Riegel's state claims against Medtronic.291
The examples above illustrate that both Congress and state legislatures have put significant
barriers in place to prevent injured plaintiffs from seeking relief. Federal preemption doctrine,
PREP Immunity, and state laws that grant immunity to medical device manufactures, health care
providers, and other parties that are currently combating COVID-19 significantly undermine an
injured party's ability to succeed on a cause of action against such parties.
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PART II: Precedent
There is little new about litigation centering around the interaction between state laws and
the federal regulation of medical devices in the United States.2 92 The following cases illustrate how
courts have broadly interpreted the preemption doctrine and the PREP Act indemnification
provisions and, thereby, foreclosed most opportunities for an injured plaintiff to seek relief and
recover for medical device-related injuries.
1. R.F. v. Abbott Laboratories
At the height at the 1980s HIV/AIDS epidemic, scientists discovered that the human
immunodeficiency virus could be transmitted through intravenous drug use, blood transfusions,
and sexual contact. 29 3 This discovery had an immediate impact on the availability of safe blood in
the United States because individuals with HIV and members of other high-risk groups were
excluded as potential donors. 294 To ensure the safety of the nation's blood supply, FDA applied
for, and, ultimately, received, the patent for the National Cancer Institute's "HIV screening test." 2 95
The "Enzyme Linked Immunoabsorbant Assays" (ELISA) HIV test was the first diagnostic
product that could detect HIV in blood samples. 296 The ELISA test was approximately 85%
effective in detecting infected blood samples. 297 The FDA published a solicitation seeking device
manufacturers that were willing to mass produce ELIA test kits and distribute them to blood banks
across the country. 2 98 Given the severity of the epidemic, FDA required manufacturers to obtain a

See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption:A Defense ofParallelClaims Based on Violations
of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1197 (2011)
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license from FDA prior to marketing the HIV tests. 2 99 In 1984, Abbott Laboratories responded to
FDA's solicitation and FDA granted Abbott a license to develop an HIV antibody test. 30 0
The FDA was "intimately and proactively involved in the development [and] clinical trials"
of Abbott's proposed medical device. 30 1 As one FDA scientist testified at trial,
It was an intense relationship, I mean, it was a very high-pressured time .... There
was a big stake in getting that test out, so we all recognized it was everybody's first
priority. In all of the years I was in FDA and talking about priorities on hot drug
development or hot biologic development, I can't think of any time there was more
priority than that intense period of getting an effective AIDS test out.

302

FDA conducted a massive mailing campaign to blood banks and physicians regarding the use and
limitations of Abbott's HIV test before permitting it to go to market. 303 These letters informed
interested parties that "a negative antibody test result does not necessarily mean that one is free
from virus. Antibodies may not have developed, or be undetectable, if infection was recent." 30 4
These steps demonstrated "'the enormous effort that was made not only by [the FDA] but also by
industry and others to fully inform users of [the new test of] what could be expected of it.'

305

On March 1, 1985, the FDA authorized Abbott Labs to manufacture and market the first
commercially-available in vitro ELIA HIV test. 306 Soon thereafter, Abbott began to work on a
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"Second Generation" test to improve sensitivity in the "window period" of the infection.3 07 This
second test was designed to better "detect all positive samples that falsely registered below the
cutoff." 308 Unfortunately, on September 4, 1986, R.F. underwent a blood transfusion that was
infected with HIV.309 A local blood bank used the Abbott device to test the unit of blood with
which R.F. was transfused.3 1 0 The test produced a "borderline result," that is, a result that was
slightly below the cutoff value detailed in the test's package insert. 31" Consistent with the FDAguided test instructions, the blood sample was not retested.

12

A year after the surgery, R.F. was

informed that she was infected with HIV. 31 3
The issue underlying this case stems from Abbott's test package insert.3 1 4 In order to
understand the controversy, it is important to understand how antibody tests work. The Abbott
antibody test, otherwise known as a serology test, was designed to detect whether a person has
been exposed to the HIV virus.3 1 5 The test detects HIV antibodies, which are proteins in the blood
that try to fight off the viral infection. 3 16 The efficacy of serology tests depends on their

Id. at 1182 ("Specifically, the FDA understood that since all ELISA tests detected the presence of antibodies to
virus, and not the presence of viruses themselves, the tests were by design subject to a "window period" during which
an infected individual does not have detectable levels of antibodies, causing the test to produce false-negative results.
That 'window period' is the length of time required for the body to produce enough antibodies to be detected. In 198586, the scientific community could not predict precisely how long the window period was for HIV. The FDA
understood that it was possible that there were individuals infected with the HIV virus who had not yet produced HIV
antibodies and, therefore, could donate infected blood (fully-capable of spreading the disease) that could not be
screened by any of the manufacturers' ELISA tests.").
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"sensitivity," or their ability to identify the presence of antibodies (true positive rate), and
"specificity," or their ability to identify the absence of antibodies (true negative rate).3 17 For any
serological test, sensitivity and specificity are determined by a cutoff value, which is the point
between normal and abnormal results.3 18 The cutoff value should vary to increase sensitivity or
specificity; in this case, the device was detecting HIV, a deadly disease, so a test with high
propensity to identify the presence of antibodies was needed. 319
As part of the FDA approval process, Abbott submitted a draft test package insert, which
stated: "Specimens with absorbance values within a + 10% range of the Cutoff Value should be
retested to confirm the initial results." 320 FDA instructed Abbott to delete this provision and not
retest "borderline" negative samples because "there was no scientific basis for the belief that
samples close to the borderline were more likely to be false-negative than negative samples with
results well below the cutoff." 32 1 The FDA determined that such a retesting requirement would
yield a higher rate of false-positive results that could cause blood banks to destroy blood samples

31
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1 d. at 1179 n.5 ("To run Abbott's test, a blood bank technician would place 1/4 inch polystyrene, virus-coated
beads,
into a plastic tray provided with the test kit. In separate wells of the tray, positive and negative control solutions
(solutions with or without the HIV antibody, respectively) are added. The technician then calculates the cutoff value
for that particular test based on a mean value associated with the positive and negative control solutions. The cutoff
value, which is computed individually each time the test is run, is ultimately used to determine whether the donor's
blood sample is positive or negative. Then, the patient's blood (diluted with a buffer) is placed in the well with the
beads. After a few cycles of incubation, and the addition of an enzyme marker, the sample is measured by a special
device, and compared to the cutoff value previously calculated for that test cycle. According to the package insert, if
the sample is above the cutoff, it is retested; if it is below the cutoff it is deemed negative for the HIV antibody."); see
also Anthony K. Akobeng, UnderstandingDiagnosticTests 3: Receiver Operating CharacteristicCurves, 96 ACTA
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and disqualify donors and, thus, limit the pool of blood donors nationwide. 322 FDA ultimately
determined the final cutoff value for the Abbott device.32 3
The final package insert instructed blood bank technicians that any blood sample: (1) with
values less than the cutoff are negative for HIV; (2) with values greater than or equal to the cutoff
value should be retested; and (3) which have been found to be repeatedly above the cutoff value
are interpreted to be positive for HIV. 324 The insert stated that the test's sensitivity and specificity
were estimated to be 98.3% and 99.8%, respectively. 325
In 1989, two years after R.F. received her HIV diagnosis, she filed a complaint against
Abbott326 contending that the company provided inadequate warnings in the ELISA test package
insert.3 2 7 R.F. alleged that Abbott was aware that the test produced false-negative results near the
"borderline."

32 8 R.F.

also claimed that Abbott had a duty to warn of the danger of borderline results

and/or instruct blood banks to retest such samples under New Jersey law.3 2 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that R.F.'s state law duty to warn claims were
impliedly preempted due to the FDA's unique regulation of the Abbott test. 330

The Court

concluded that "the unique circumstances under which the Test arose (a national health crisis
surrounding the emergence of the AIDS epidemic and the loss of a safe national blood supply),
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g[ave] rise to implied preemption of the plaintiffs' state law claims." 3

The Court reasoned that

FDA's control over the Abbott test "was so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference "that
[the FDA] left no room for the state[s] to supplement it."

3

Any state law that required the retesting

of "borderline" samples directly conflicted with the instructions from the FDA.3 33 The Court
explained that the fact that the FDA mandated that Abbott remove its original proposed retesting
provision from its package insert demonstrates that FDA did not want such samples retested. 3 4
The Court distinguished this case from Lohr on the basis that it did not involve a "substantial
equivalence" determination.3

Rather, the requirements the FDA imposed on Abbott's device

were unique and exceeded the rigorous PMA process for other medical devices.3 36 Thus, the Court
held that R.F.'s state duty-to-warn claims were preempted.

7

2. Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health Department
In the spring of 2009, a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus instigated a global pandemic. 338
The United States declared H1N1 a public health emergency, invoking the FDA's PREP Act
authority to issue EUAs for qualified MCMs. 339 In response to the pandemic, the Governor of New
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York issued an executive order authorizing state and local health departments to establish
immunization programs in order to facilitate the mass inoculation of the general public.34 0 On
December 3, 2009, the St. Lawrence County Public Health Department held a vaccination at an
elementary school in the Lisbon, New York.341 As mentioned previous, informed consent is not
required to administer a EUA product under FDA rules.34 2 Without such consent, a nurse
administered the H1N1 vaccine, Peramivir, to the Parkers' daughter, who was a kindergartener at
the time.3 43 The Parkers thereafter filed an action against St. Lawrence County alleging negligence
and battery. 34 4
The sole issue on appeal was whether the PREP Act preempted the Parkers' state tort
claims.3 45 The Appellate Division of the State of New York held that it did. 346 The court concluded
that the PREP Act immunity provision shielded from liability harms resulting from the
administration of a MCM, here the vaccine. 347 The court presumed "that Congress fully understood
that errors in administering a vaccination program may have physical as well as emotional
consequences, and determined that such potential tort liability must give way to the need to
promptly and efficiently respond to a pandemic or other public health emergency."
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all state law tort claims arising from the administration of covered countermeasures . . .. "349 Thus,
the Parkers' state law claims were dismissed. 350

PART III: Recommendations
History teaches that, in the face of a public health emergency like COVID-19 or H1N1,
Congress and the FDA will respond to safeguard the public health. 351 The same history teaches
that Congress and the FDA prioritize medical product manufacturers' bottom line over medical
device's safety and effectiveness.
As noted above, Congress enacted the PREP Act immunity provisions to incentivize device
manufacturers to develop critical countermeasures that are key to containing and defeating a
biological threat. 352 This immunity, however, has evolved from a necessary incentive to support
the development and manufacture of countermeasures crucial to a coordinated pandemic response
to near-blanket immunity that extends to any person or entity who comes into contact with a
covered countermeasure. 5
There is little doubt that FDA's scheme for regulating medical products for emergency use
will result in injuries sustained in the course of a public health emergency.

The FDA must

349 Id.

Id. It is important to note that there are two other cases that address PREP Act immunity. In Kehler v. Hood, No.
4:11CV1416 FRB, 2012 WL 1945952, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 30, 2012), the court dismissed the action against an
alleged manufacturer of the H1N1 vaccine because the plaintiff did not dispute that they were covered parties under
the PREP Act. In Casabiancav. Mount Sinai Medical Center, No. 112790/10, 2014 WL 10413521, at *1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 02, 2014), the Court found that the PREP Act was inapplicable because the defendant hospital never
administered a MCM. While this paper's focus is on medical devices, these cases serve as an example of the breath
of PREP Act immunity and the potential barriers injured parties must overcome to recover from MCM-related harms
or injuries.
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coordinate a creative response that permits potentially life-saving technology to enter the market
promptly, while ensuring that such products will not cause more harm than good. As such, it is
beyond time that Americans demand meaningful reforms that place public health and safety over
the interests of multi-billion-dollar corporations.
1. Safety and Effectiveness of In Vitro Devices
As explained above, FDA currently allows device manufacturers to market COVID-19 in
vitro devices prior to EUA approval.3 " Under this policy, most device manufacturers must
validate their own test before market entry.35 5 After FDA validation notification, companies have
10-15 days, depending on the product, to submit an EUA. 356 Test validation requirements,
however, are not uniform. Therefore, the validation standard depends entirely on type of test and
the manufacturers' internal protocols. As such, this paper advocates that FDA independently
validate COVID-19 tests to ensure their safety and accuracy before they go to market.
The FDA plays a critical role in protecting the American public from health-related threats,
such as COVID-19. In the midst of a pandemic, the FDA must create pathways to ensure that
adequate and sufficient testing is publicly available. The FDA's current scheme for COVID-19
diagnostic and antibody tests, however, leaves the door wide open for wildly inaccurate tests that
may lead to significant injuries. The agency defends its decision to authorize the market entry of
unapproved diagnostic and antibody tests on the basis that these medical devices are low risk
because they are not used to make medical decisions. 357 The FDA's logic is flawed.
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COVID-19 is a highly contagious disease.3 5 8 It primarily spreads from person to person. 35 9
The CDC reports that it is possible that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is
detectable in the upper or lower respiratory tract for weeks after the first appearance of signs or
symptoms of the disease.3 60 Based on the available research, the average time from disease
exposure to symptom onset (the incubation period) is about five to six days.3 6 1 Studies have shown,
however, that symptoms could appear as soon as three days and as long as thirteen days postexposure.3 62 COVID-19 is often asymptomatic. 363 These characteristics of the disease establish
why the accuracy of diagnostic and antibody test is critical. As previously discussed, these tests
are used to make important treatment, tracking, quarantining, and isolating decisions that may
involve life-and-death consequences.

364

Some commentators nonetheless argue that FDA over-regulates COVID-19 tests. For
example, Professor Jessica Flanigan, the Richard L. Morrill Chair in Ethics and Democratic Values
at the University of Richmond, contends that there are key differences between COVID-19 tests
and

other FDA-regulated

medical

devices.3 65

Specifically,

she

posits

that, "[u]nlike

pharmaceuticals or a medical procedure, tests don't really pass the boundary of the body in that
same way. These tests just provide people information, in general, about their bodies. So, the risks
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of any kind of diagnostic test are already typically very low and, in general, the harms would be
informational harms. Informational harms are easy to reverse because if people get inaccurate
information you could just correct that by providing this accurate information."3 66 The Federalist
Society has advanced an argument that even minimal FDA regulation serves as a significant barrier
to COVID-19 testing.3 6 7 "By late March, [the FDA's] loosening of regulatory burdens had
unleashed our enormous private sector testing capacity to combat this virus."3 6 8 These
commentators, however, fail to realize that inaccurate COVID-19 test results can lead to injuries
that are difficult to characterize as merely "informational."
First, a false positive can lead people to believe that they are immune to COVID-19 and
therefore invincible, when in fact they may both be vulnerable to infection and capable of
spreading the disease.3 69 Imagine, for example, the potential outcomes of providing an inaccurate
COVID-19 test result to a nurse who works five-days-a-week in a residential care facility with a
high-risk population.37 0
Second, governors' decisions to reopen their states are largely driven by testing data.3 7 1
Experts recommend that states refrain from reopening until they realize a two-week drop in new
COVID-19 cases.3 72 A state that relies on the Abbott REAL ID Now test, which reportedly misses
a high number of positive COVID-19 cases, to make reopening determinations is grounding its
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public health policy on faulty data that could potentially lead to devastating results. In Florida, for
example, a local health care company reported it is possible that "as many as 33,000 Florida
patients who took COVID-19 tests may have been told incorrect results or received no results at
all." 3 73 This news comes as the State was experiencing two consecutive days of 2,000-plus new
COVID-19 cases while rolling out its reopening plan.3 7 4
The FDA is clear that, "[i]n the context of a public health emergency involving pandemic
infectious disease, it is critically important that tests are validated because false results not only
can negatively impact the individual patient but also can have broad public health impact." 3 75 Yet,
these examples illustrate the damage that inaccurate testing results might have on the country's
response to COVID-19. This paper argues that these unacceptable inaccuracy rates are a direct
result of FDA's lax regulation of COVID-19 medical devices.
The FDA relinquishes its role as the gatekeeper of public health and safety when it
delegates the validation of these devices solely to their manufacturers. In an April 23, 2020
interview, FDA Commissioner Stephen Hahn acknowledged that "some of these marketed tests
may not have done the careful validation studies that need to be done." 3 76 Therefore, it is not
surprising that the FDA implemented a new policy and began validating certain antibody tests
through a collaborative effort with the NIH, CDC and Biomedical Advanced Research and
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Development Authority recently.3 7 7 While this is a step in the right direction, FDA should not limit
pre-market agency validation requirements to just a select number of tests. The FDA must expand
the agency's review of validation data to all tests prior to their entry into the market. In the event
that the FDA and its partners lack the resources and capacity to vet the validation of all tests during
a public health emergency, this paper recommends that the FDA require COVID-19 test
manufacturers to "obtain confirmation of the first five positive and the first five negative clinical
specimens using an EUA-authorized assay, which may involve sending these ten specimens to
another laboratory for confirmation" and promptly notify FDA if confirmation cannot be
obtained. 37 8
The grace period that the FDA currently extends to manufacturers between introducing a
product to market and submitting an EUA raises additional concerns. FDA contends that this
timeline "is a reasonable period of time to prepare an EUA submission for a test that has already
been validated." 379 In addition, FDA is clear "if [a] problem [with the EUA application] is
significant and cannot be addressed in a timely manner, and the manufacturer has already
distributed the device, FDA would expect the manufacturer to suspend distribution and conduct a
recall of the test." 380 The agency, however, ignores the fact that, once a faulty product is on the
market, the damage it wrecks could be irreversible.
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As mentioned previously, the FDA issued an EUA for the Abbott Labs ID NOW COVID19 test on March 18, 2020.381 The company deployed 150,000 tests immediately. 382 News quickly
broke that the Abbott device missed 48% of positive cases of COVID-19 that other devices
detected.3 83 It is reasonable to assume at this point in the pandemic that millions of these Abbott
tests have entered the market. If FDA's current investigation3 8 4 concludes that the Abbott test must
be recalled, hundreds of thousands of individuals' test results-who have likely been behaving
consistent with those results-will be at issue. This scenario exemplifies the danger of permitting
device manufacturers to market their products while pending EUA approval.

Given these

significant public health concerns, FDA ought to preclude the marketing of diagnostic tests until
it issues an EUA.
2. PREP Act Liability Protections During COVID-19
As the Abbott Labs and Parker precedent instruct, Congress has made clear that product
manufacturers and similar parties enjoy near blanket immunity from liability when responding to
a public health emergency. 385 The regulations state that, so long as the elements of PREP Act
immunity are satisfied, immunity extends to tort and contract claims, in addition to the losses
stemming from the use of a covered countermeasure.3 8 6 Utilizing his authority under the PREP
Act, Secretary Azar has extended immunity to medical product manufacturers, distributors,
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administrators , and healthcare providers for harms inflicted by devices designed to counteract the
COVID-19 pandemic.3 8 7 As was held in Parker, immunity applies to device manufacturers and
distributors regardless of whether the MCM was administered or used by an individual. 3 88
The PREP Act's current liability immunity provision is extremely broad and demands
clarification. The statute says covered persons and entities "shall be immune from suit and liability
under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating
to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered
countermeasure." 389 A covered countermeasure in this context includes any COVID-19 diagnostic
or antibody test that is cleared or authorized by FDA for emergency use. 390 HHS regulations define
a covered countermeasure as any medical device that is "used to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent, or
mitigate COVID-19, or the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom, or any
device used in the administration of any such product, and all components and constituent
materials of any such product." 39 1 As such, the immunity provision extend not only to medical
devices used to combat COIVD-19, but devices that are used for non-emergency purposes as well,
so long as they are used to support the treatment of COVID-19. The statute, therefore, expressly
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extends immunity from liability to any number of devices not designed to combat COVID-19,
including, for example, the Medtronic Transvene ICD Lead System device previously mentioned,
that otherwise would not be protected. 392
The "relating to, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the
use by an individual" language in the statute includes harm-producing scenarios that have no basis
for broad immunity protection. HHS concedes, in fact, that this language extends immunity to a
"slip-and-fall injury or vehicle collision by a recipient receiving a countermeasure [i.e., drug or
device] at a retail store serving as an administration or dispensing location." 39 3 Congress should
amend the PREP Act to narrow the scope of covered entities and persons that are immune from
liability by eliminating the overly broad "arising out of, relating to" terminology. 394
Congress should end blanket immunity and more precisely and narrowly define which
claims are immune from suit. Blanket immunity creates perverse incentives insofar as it rewards
individuals and entities who act less reasonably in the context of an emergency. For example,
nursing homes have lobbied many states for immunity during the COVID-19 pandemic 39 5 on the
theory that the industry faces substantial litigation risk because it is treating patients that are highly
susceptible to COVID-19. 396 Proponents of blanket immunity, however, have struggled to deliver
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convincing arguments that the elimination of overbroad immunity will lead to an influx of
burdensome litigation.
As Professor Nina Kohn has explained, nursing homes will typically be liable only "if they
fail to act reasonably under the circumstances and that failure leads to foreseeable physical
harm." 397 If an injured resident files suit against a nursing home, a court will consider: (1) the
underlying public health emergency and its risks to its residents; and (2) what other nursing homes
would have done in the same or a similar situation. 398 Professor Kohn notes that "conduct that
would be negligent in normal times may be permissible during a pandemic."3 9 9 In other words, so
long as a nursing home complies with professional norms for the industry in the context of the
emergency, it is likely to defeat negligence suits. 4 0 0
The problem with blanket immunity not limited to its propensity to shield the worst actors;
it also punishes good actors by giving a competitive advantage to bad actors whose unreasonable
actions place public health and safety at risk. As pointed out earlier, TestUtah faces criticism
regarding the accuracy of its COVID-19 diagnostic tests. 401 Data published by the Salt Lake City
Tribune demonstrated that the positive rate for TestUtah's patients with COVID-19 symptoms was
less than half that of other test providers. 402 On June 15, 2020, the newspaper reported that one of
TestUtah's investors is seeking certification for a class-action law suit sounding in securities fraud
against Co-Diagnostics, the manufacturer of the TestUtah COVID-19 test. 4 0 3 The investor alleges

397 Id.
3 98

399

Id.
Id.

400Id.
401

Alberty, supra note 56.

402 Id.
403

Erin Alberty, Investor sues maker of coronavirustest used by Test Utah, THE

SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Jun. 15, 2020),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/06/15/investor-sues-maker/ (last visited Jun. 17, 2020).

61

that Co-Diagnostics' stock prices increased due to the company's claim that the tests showed 100%
sensitivity - "a staggering claim that appeared to set Co-Diagnostics apart from other competitors
developing COVID-19 tests." 40 4 While a securities fraud might satisfy the "willful misconduct"
standard, this example illustrates that those who engage in similarly egregious conduct may be
immune for liability for claims that are related to COVID-19 diagnostic devices.
Proponents of blanket immunity argue that the doctrine is the only thing standing between
covered persons and entities and a "tsunami of litigation" that will consume the country. 40 5 As
Secretary Azar has contended, "for health care professionals to feel comfortable serving in
expanded capacities on the frontlines of the COVID-19 emergency, it is imperative that they feel
shielded from medical tort liability." 406 Professor James Hodge, an Arizona State University law
professor and regional director at the Network for Public Health Law, argues that immunity for
COVID-19 providers "'is good for patients' because it encourages providers to work in
extraordinarily tough conditions."

407

These arguments, however, are difficult to square with the

empirical evidence regarding tort lawsuits.
A Wall Street Journal analysis of 2017 data from the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) found that tort cases declined from 16% of state court civil filings in 1993 to about 4 % of
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filings in 2015-a decline by more than 1.7 million cases. 408 Medical malpractice and products
liability cases only accounted for 4% and 2% of state tort caseloads, respectively. 409 A study
conducted by the American Medical Association similarly found "no association between
measures of malpractice liability risk and health care quality and outcomes. Although gaps in the
evidence remain, the available findings suggested that greater tort liability, at least in its current
form, was not associated with improved quality of care." 4 10
Even when faced with these statistics, proponents of broad liability argue that narrowing
immunity will nonetheless force providers and device manufacturers to defend such suits, which
studies suggest constitute about 2.4% of total health care spending, even if they ultimately win. 411
This argument ignores the fact that plaintiff's lawyers work on a contingency basis, and therefore,
are highly incentivized to refuse to represent plaintiffs who do not have a viable cause of action. 41 2
Another study conducted by NCSC concluded that the median cost of medical malpractice and
contract litigation are $122,000 and $91,000, respectively. 41 1 The contingency payment structure
and the rising costs of litigation give lawyers and their clients a strong incentive to avoid bringing
lawsuits that may not result in a meaningful damages award.
Congress should amend the PREP Act to eliminate immunity for distributors, program
planners, and qualified persons who prescribe, administer, or dispense covered countermeasures
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to stay true to the intent of the legislation. 4 14 Congress also should explicitly state that tort claims
are expressly preempted by federal law. Under this proposal, device manufacturers would retain
immunity for the most likely claims to arise from the public's use of its marketed covered
countermeasures as Congress intended but not for claims that arise well outset that context, which
were not at issue in the legislative history. Moreover, allowing contract claims to proceed would
incentivize device manufacturers to ensure that their devices are safe and effective before market
entry.

3. Remedies under the PREP Act
As Abbott Labs and Parkerdemonstrate, individuals that are injured by medical devices in
the context of a public health emergency will either be precluded from bringing suit under the
PREP Act or be preempted from bringing a state tort claim under the preemption doctrine. 415 The
only cause of action that injured individuals may bring pursuant to the PREP Act is for willful
misconduct related to a COVID-19 MCM. 4 16 Such claims are difficult to win because they demand
that the injured person prove that the defendant's "willful misconduct" proximately caused death
or serious injury by clear and convincing evidence. 41 7
Under the PREP Act, any covered persons or entities that act in accordance "with
applicable

directions,

guidelines,

or recommendations

by the

Secretary

regarding

the

administration or use of a covered countermeasure" will not be found to have engaged in "willful
misconduct." 4 18 Likewise, a state or local health authority who is "provided with notice of
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information regarding serious physical injury or death from the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure" is exempt from this standard. 4 19 In New Jersey, for example, an executive order
allows retired medical practitioners who have been administratively suspended to reenter practice
as part of the state's efforts to combat COVID-19. 420 Under the PREP Act, a New Jersey retiree
who engages in egregious misconduct during COVID-19 cannot be found to have engaged in
"willful misconduct," so long as they have informed the state of information regarding serious
physical injury or death attributed to the use of the covered countermeasure. Essentially, any
covered person or entity who follows orders will be protected from engaging in "willful
misconduct" regardless of the underlying conduct. Likewise, an injured individual is precluded
from bringing a willful misconduct claim against manufactures or distributors of covered MCMs
that are subject to regulation by PREP or the FDCA, unless those entities already have been
successfully prosecuted by the government. 421
In addition to these exemptions under the "willful misconduct" standard, litigants face a
variety of other challenges. If a plaintiff wishes to bring a claim for "willful misconduct," the
litigant must bring the suit before United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 422 The
plaintiff must verify the complaint by providing an expert affidavit on its validity. 423
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immunity.42 4 The litigation obstacles that plaintiffs must overcome demonstrate that an injured
party will have little chance to successfully bring a claim for "willful misconduct." While this is
presented as a remedy for injured plaintiffs, it is clearly another layer of protection for device
manufacturers and other entities.
Congress, therefore, should amend the "willful misconduct" standard and eliminate the
current exemptions to the rule in order to make it easier for injured plaintiffs to bring a claim
against device manufactures whose MCM allegedly has caused them injury. The empirical
evidence establishes that Americans are not as litigious as immunity proponents claim. Removing
these exemptions will permit negligently injured individuals to be made whole while incentivizing
device manufacturers to ensure their devices are safe and effective before market entry.
It bears mentioning that COVID-19 has caused uncalculatable damage to the American
people. In addition to the grim national death toll, the U.S. unemployment rose higher in the first
three months of the COVID-19 pandemic than it did during two years of the Great Recession. 425
COVID-19 also continues to disproportionally impact communities of color, particularly African
Americans, who have suffered exponential extravagant COVID-19 mortality than white people. 42 6
Medical device manufacturers, however, are set to make billions of dollars in revenue as
the virus continues to spread and the dead toll rises. Abbott Labs, for example, reported $7.7
billion in sales worldwide during the first quarter of 2020: $2,856 billion in total U.S. sales and
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$803 million stemming from diagnostics. 427 TestIowa was awarded a $26 million-dollar contract
to launch its statewide testing initiative, which is now under investigation. 4 28 Device manufacturers
are profiting off the suffering of the American people. As such, Congress must amend the "willful
misconduct" standard and eliminate the barriers that make bringing such a claim nearly impossible.
In order to deter "willful misconduct" on the part of device manufacturers, FDA should
adopt an "exclusion" scheme similar to that of the DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). 4 2 9
In health fraud and abuse cases, the OIG has the authority to exclude individuals and entities from
federally funded health care programs, such as Medicare or Medicaid. 43 0 Exclusion is a remedial
measure designed to protect the federal health care programs from any person whose continued
participation in the programs constitutes a risk to the programs and their beneficiaries. 4 31 If an
individual or entity is excluded, federal health care programs like Medicare or Medicaid may not
pay for any items or services ordered by an excluded person.
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Under this proposal, if FDA

determines that a device manufacturer has engaged in "willful misconduct," or has a pattern of
such behavior, FDA will "exclude" the company and refuse to process its marketing applications
for a period of time reflective of the severity of the manufacturer's misconduct.

Just as OIG

exclusion is designed to protect federal health care programs from person whose pose a risk, the
FDA will be protecting the public from corporations that have engaged in conduct that places their
safety at risk.
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Finally, as previously mentioned, the PREP Act provides seriously injured plaintiffs the
opportunity to recover through the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program. 43 3 Similar to
the "willful conduct" cause of action, the CICP makes recover difficult for victims. The CICP
program is a fund of last resort, which means that the injured plaintiff must exhaust all available
remedies and apply for funding before the one-year filling deadline expires. 4 34 Most importantly,
CICP funding is subject to legislative appropriations and, as such, Congress may "change the
program's parameters, if appropriate under the circumstances then prevailing, prior to the
expenditure of federal taxpayer funds." 435 This paper argues that Congress should extend the
statutory filing deadline to three years and, therefore, provide giving injured parties ample
opportunity to seek relief elsewhere before resorting to CICP. Instead of requiring the general
public to ensure device manufacture misconduct, Congress ought to require device manufacturers
to pay annual fees into the fund in exchange for immunity from liability.

CONCLUSION
Since September 11, 2001, Congress has enacted several pieces of legislation to ensure that
the nation is prepared to effectively respond to public health emergencies. The FDA plays a vital
role in our country's response to an infectious disease pandemic. Since the enactment of Project
BioShield, Congress and the FDA have expanded the scope of emergency use authorization to
streamline critical medical products to market. Device manufactures are permitted to take their
public health emergency products to market with little to no independent regulatory oversite. The
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concerningly inaccurate COVID-19 tests manufactured by Abbott Labs, TestUtah, and Anhui
DeepBlue Medical Technology and authorized for use by FDA provide a cautionary tale.

It

appears that the FDA emergency use authorization scheme favors corporate interests at the expense
of public health and safety.
In addition, courts have interpreted the PREP Act to provide near blanket immunity for
public health emergency device manufacturers. Injured parties are also preempted from brining
state tort causes of action against these companies. This is particularly troubling given that the
PREP Act establishes a single federal cause of action for "willful misconduct" - a standard of
conduct that is exceeding difficult to proof by clear and convincing evidence. Congress and the
FDA must put the public interest first by implementing transparent and effective regulatory
reforms to address issues caused by an expedited EUA process and blanket immunity.
First, the FDA should independently validate COVID-19 tests and other emergency use
products to ensure their safety and accuracy before they go to market. The agency should similarly
preclude the marketing of such tests until it reviews the product and issues an EUA. Congress, on
the other hand, should narrow the immunity provision in the PREP Act and more precisely define
which claims are immune from suit. Congress also must amend the "willful misconduct" standard
to eliminate the barriers that make bringing such a claim nearly impossible. In addition, Congress
ought to provide seriously injured plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to recover through the
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program.

These proposed reforms will become more

critical as the COVID-19 pandemic progresses and the United States prepares for our next public
health emergency.
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